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Dual-class common stock allows for the separation of voting rights and cash flow rights across the
different classes of equity. We construct a large sample of dual-class firms in the United States and
analyze the relationships of insider's cash flow rights and voting rights with firm value, performance,
and investment behavior. We find that relationship of firm value to cash flow rights is positive and
concave and the relationship to voting rights is negative and convex. Identical quadratic
relationships are found for the respective ownership variables with sales growth, capital
expenditures, and the combination of R&D and advertising. Our evidence is consistent with an
entrenchment effect of voting control that leads managers to underinvest and an incentive effect of



















In the classic analysis of Jensen and Meckling (1976), managerial equity 
ownership helps to align the interests of the manager and minority shareholders. There, 
the focus is on the cash flow rights associated with ownership. But managerial equity 
ownership has implications not only for incentives, but also control. The votes included 
with equity ownership can create entrenchment, and an entrenched management may be 
immune to career concerns [Fama (1980) and Holmstrom (1999)], the discipline of the 
product market [Hart (1983)], monitoring by large shareholders [Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986)], and value-enhancing takeovers [Jensen and Ruback (1983), Franks and Mayer 
(1990)].
1 In this situation, managers may expropriate minority shareholders and extract 
what Grossman and Hart (1988) call the private benefits of control. Although in principle 
incentives could be provided without giving the control of equity, in practice the vast 
majority of managerial incentives come from equity ownership [Jensen and Murphy 
(1990)] 
Since theoretical arguments identify both positive (incentive) and negative 
(control) effects of managerial ownership, an active empirical literature has attempted to 
disentangle the two effects and identify an optimal level of ownership.
2  The seminal 
work of Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) finds that market value is related to insider 
ownership in a non-monotonic way. For the largest listed firms in 1980, market value is 
                                                 
1 Shleifer and Vishny (1997) provide a complete survey of these and other corporate 
governance mechanisms. 
2 Of course, managers cannot do their job – nor gain the benefit of any incentives -- 
without some form of control over the organization.  In this paper, when we refer to 
control we mean “voting control”, as opposed to the “administrative control” enjoyed by 
all delegated management.  Administrative control is always subordinate to voting 
control.   2
increasing in board ownership over the range of zero to five percent, consistent with the 
agency theory. But, consistent with entrenchment, over the range of five to twenty-five 
percent, market value falls with board ownership.  This result has been confirmed in 
various samples since then.  For example, McConnell and Servaes (1990) use a more 
comprehensive sample of firms and find a similar non-monotonic relationship between 
ownership and Q.  Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan (1999) find a similar pattern in 
firms from 1935.  
The relationship between inside ownership and firm value has also been explored 
outside the U.S.  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Sheifer, and Vishny (2002) examine the 
relationship between control ownership and firm value in 27 countries.  They find that 
higher cash flow ownership by insiders increases firm value.  A similar analysis was 
undertaken by Seifert, Gonenc, and Wright (2002) for the U.S., U.K., Germany, and 
Japan.  They examine a much larger sample of firms than La Porta et al. and find similar 
results.  In all four countries, greater inside ownership of shares leads to higher market 
valuations.   
One constraint in these studies is that the two separate forces – incentives and 
control – must be identified using only one variable – ownership.  An analysis of “dual-
class” companies offers a way around this problem.  The typical dual-class company 
offers one class of common stock with superior voting rights and one class of common 
stock with inferior voting rights.  Management and other insiders often hold the superior 
voting class in greater proportion.  Since these firms have equity structures that break the 
link between cash flow incentives and voting control, determining the ownership 
structure of dual-class firms allows one to separate the role of these two effects.   3
Previous studies of dual-class firms suggest that the separation of voting and cash 
flow ownership may have significant negative implications for firm valuation. Bebchuk, 
Kraakman, and Triantis (2000) explore the costs of a manager’s ability to separate cash 
flow rights from control rights.  They argue that many of the common mechanisms, such 
as dual-class shares, can lead to large agency costs.  They further maintain that the 
agency costs associated with such structures are an order of magnitude larger than those 
existing in firms in which insiders own a majority of the shares.  One result that has 
appeared prominently outside the U.S. has been a transfer of value from holders of the 
inferior class to holders of the superior class.  Nenova (2000), Levy (1982), and Zingales 
(1995) examine the value of voting rights by examining the valuation differential 
between inferior and superior voting stock in international dual-class firms.  In these 
papers, the superior voting stock trades at a premium to the inferior voting shares.   
Amoako-Adu and Smith (2001) examine dual-class IPOs and find that the managers of 
these firms, in general, are perceived to not pursue the interests of shareholders. 
In emerging markets, cash flow rights and control rights are often separated 
through multiple classes of stock or pyramidal ownership structures.  Two recent papers 
exploit this separation with studies in the same spirit as our paper. Lins (2003) examines 
the relation between management ownership of shares in over one thousand companies in 
18 emerging markets.  In particular, Lins looks at the effect of separating cash flow and 
control rights.  He finds that when the voting ownership of management is higher than the 
cash flow ownership, firm value is lower.   Claessens et al. (2002) study 1300 firms from 
eight East Asian countries and find that firm value increases with the cash flow   4
ownership of the largest shareholder but decreases when the voting ownership exceeds 
the cash flow ownership.   
Because emerging markets have a large potential for agency problems, they are an 
important source for these studies.  Nevertheless, these markets are very different from 
those in developed countries in terms of legal, regulatory, and institutional factors, so it is 
difficult to extend the conclusions between them.  To determine the relative importance 
of incentives and control for the largest capital markets, we need to build and analyze a 
dataset for those markets.  That is the primary purpose of this paper.  To carry out this 
task, we collect ownership information of each class of common stock and tabulate the 
fraction of cash flow rights and the fraction of voting rights that are held by insiders of 
the firm.  We show that in many firms there is a large divergence between these two 
ownership measures.  We then undertake an examination of the relationships among 
voting ownership, cash flow ownership, firm value, and firm performance.  
We find that firm value (as measured by Tobin’s Q) is increasing in cash flow 
ownership and decreasing in voting ownership.  Both of these effects are non-linear: 
positive and concave for cash flow and negative and convex for voting.  The positive 
effect of incentives peaks at approximately 33% while the negative impact of voting 
ownership peaks at approximately 45%.  For operating performance, we find that the 
relationship of ownership and sales growth follows the same patterns: positive and 
concave with cash flow rights and negative and convex with voting ownership.  We again 
find the same patterns for capital expenditures and for the combined level of R&D and 
advertising.     5
These empirical results can be interpreted two ways.  One interpretation is causal: 
the misalignment of incentives leads dual-class firms to invest too little, leading to lower 
sales growth and valuations.  A second interpretation is not causal: the observed patterns 
of voting and cash-flow ownership are endogenous responses by firms to their different 
environments.  While we do not have any instruments to allow us to distinguish between 
these two interpretations, we are skeptical of the second.  While some part of ownership 
structure across a broad group of firms is certainly endogenous to other firm 
characteristics, it is difficult to reconcile our full set of results with any plausible model of 
this endogeneity.  To do so would require the same quadratic structure of relationships 
among all of tests.  Also, since our regressions are estimated on industry-adjusted 
dependent variables for samples that include only dual-class firms, any endogeneity story 
must work within this sample and not through selection into the dual-class category.  The 
causal story is straightforward, the non-causal story is not.  Thus, we will use causal 
language in some parts of the paper, even though we acknowledge at the outset that we 
do not make a statistical demonstration of causality.        
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The data construction and summary 
statistics are presented in Section 2.  The effect of cash flow ownership and voting 
ownership on firm value and performance is examined in Section 3.  Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Data 
2.1. Data Formation Procedure 
Because no single source provides comprehensive information on companies with 
dual-class common stock, we collect data from three separate samples and combine them   6
in our analysis.  Our master sample is formed by identifying dual-class companies from 
the Securities Data Company (SDC), the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), 
and the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC).  Each source has strengths and 
weaknesses in its identification of dual-class companies. 
The SDC sample is compiled from the Global New Issues Database, which tracks 
corporate new issues activity since 1970.  Using a “flag” embedded within this database 
for new stock issues where the firm already has an existing, separate class of stock, a 
preliminary list of potential dual-class firmswas formulated.  Similarly, we searched the 
CRSP database to identify companies that had more than one existing class of stock.  
This was accomplished by identifying companies with more than one seventh and eighth 
digit suffix to their six-digit root Committee on Uniform Security Identification 
Procedures number (CUSIP).  While the first six digits of a CUSIP (the “issuer number”) 
identify the particular firm that has issued the security, the last two digits (the “issue 
number”) identify particular issues.  A third list was assembled using the IRRC’s 
Corporate Takeover Defenses texts from 1990 to 2002 (Rosenbaum 1990, 1993, 1995, 
1998, 2000, and 2002).  In these texts, the existence of a dual-class structure is one of the 
many takeover provisions that the IRRC identifies.   
These three lists provide our sample of potential dual-class firms.  While we 
believe our filters will capture most large firms with dual-class structures, we recognize 
that some firms will escape our screens.  For instance, the SDC filter would miss firms 
whose second class of stock was either non-trading or issued before 1970, whether 
trading or non-trading.  The CRSP database, meanwhile, is designed to isolate solely 
dual-class firms for which both classes trade.  Finally, the IRRC source, while being able   7
to identify dual-class firms with trading or non-trading stock, is limited only to stocks in 
the S&P Super 1500.  While these sources sometimes offset each other’s weaknesses, 
some dual-class firms are likely to slip through our data filters—for example, a small 
dual-class firm whose second class of stock was issued in 1975 but is non-trading. 
For each potential dual-class firm, proxy statements were reviewed to remove the 
firms that were not actually dual class at any time during the available period of 
electronic reporting (usually 1994-present).  In addition, trust funds and some foreign 
firms with American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) were eliminated from the sample. 
Using proxy reports, 10-Ks, and all other available and relevant documentation, all 
accessed via the SEC research engine LIVEDGAR, data were collected by class on 
outstanding shares, total ownership, option ownership, and “other” ownership (defined as 
ownership of warrants, deferred shares, and/or purchase rights).  Subtracting option 
ownership and “other” ownership from total ownership resulted in a figure for the actual 
common stock ownership, by class, of directors and officers for each year. We also 
collected dividend data for all firms.  First, we coded the dividend information contained 
in the 10-Ks by class for each firm and year.  Second, we identified large, “special” 
distributions paid out to shareholders in a given year using CRSP.   
 
2.2. Summary Statistics 
Table 1 provides a summary of the data on the characteristics of the dual-class 
firms in 2001 relative to all publicly-traded companies in the CRSP-Compustat merged 
database. We refer to this full sample of non-dual-class firms as “single-class” firms, 
while at the same time recognizing that this group will include some dual-class firms that   8
have escaped our filters.  Indeed, some of the differences in the sample must be ascribed 
to the differential ability of our filters to identify large and small dual-class firms. 
 The average firm size does not appear to differ substantially between the two 
samples.  Both dual- and single-class firms have about $4 billion in assets and market 
values of between $2 and $3 billion on average.  Differences in size distributions become 
more apparent when we compare the median firm size (either assets or market values).  
The median summary statistics emphasize the very high number of small firms in the 
single-class sample.  The median dual-class company has $816 million in assets while the 
single-class sample has median assets of $187 million.  Similarly, dual-class firms have 
median market values of $656 million versus $151 million for single-class companies.   
We also find that the dual-class firms have significantly lower book-to-market 
ratios on average than do single-class firms.  The median book-to-market ratio, however, 
is not significantly different for the two samples.
3  The differences in average book-to-
market ratios are largely due to the high proportion of  small single-class companies that 
have high book-to-market ratios.   
We also find that dual-class firms are significantly more levered than single-class 
firms:  the median debt-to-assets ratio for dual-class firms is 0.21 versus 0.09 for single-
class companies.  A potential explanation for dual-class firms’ heavier reliance on debt 
financing is that investors may be reluctant to purchase the inferior voting stock of these 
firms, and they may therefore have to rely more heavily on debt financing. 
                                                 
3 For dual-class companies where only one class of stock trades, we compute market 
value by assuming that the non-traded stock has the same value per share as the traded 
stock.   9
Dual-class firms are, on average, significantly older than single-class firms.  We 
define age as the time (in years) from the firm’s CRSP listing date.  The average 
(median) age of dual-class firms in 2001 is 16.30 (12.79) years while the average 
(median) age for single-class firms is 12.62 (7.75) years.  
Finally, we compute the Governance Index (G) of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
(2003) for the IRRC sample of firms.
4  This index is comprised of 24 distinct corporate-
governance provisions, most of which can be interpreted as takeover protections. High 
values of the index are considered to be firms with high managerial power. We find that 
the average (median) G of dual-class firms is 7.18 (7.0) while the average (median)  G of 
single-class companies in 2001 is 9.09 (9.0).  It is not surprising that the dual-class 
companies have lower G indexes: since a dual-class structure is perhaps the most 
powerful antitakeover protection possible, firms with a dual-class structure may find most 
other protections to be superfluous. 
In Table 2, we list the five most common industries in both the dual-class sample 
and single-class sample.  We utilize Fama and French (1997) to classify each four-digit 
SIC code into one of 48 industry groups as of December 2001.  We find that 
Communications, Business Services, Printing and Publishing, Retail, and Machinery are 
the five industries with the greatest number of dual-class firms in 2001.  This distribution 
is different from the rest of the population of firms.  Business Services is the largest 
industry for single-class companies, followed by Electronic Equipment, Trading, 
Pharmaceutical Products, and Retail.  The predominance of communications and printing 
and publishing is not surprising.  DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) argue that the non-
                                                 
4 This index can be computed only for firms in the IRRC subsample.   10
pecuniary private benefits of consumption may be high in media-related firms and hence 
may lead founders to establish a dual-class structure in order to preserve control. 
In Panel B, we tabulate the ten largest dual-class companies in December 2001 
based on market capitalization.  Not surprisingly, communication firms make up five of 
the ten largest dual-class companies.  Viacom, Comcast, Cox Communications, Echostar, 
and HSN were all dual class at the end of 2001.  This is consistent with these firms 
having higher levels of non-pecuniary private benefits of control. 
Table 3 shows the number of dual-class companies in each year of the sample 
from 1994 through 2001. The sample grows substantially over time, from 100 dual-class 
firms in 1994 to 255 in 1998.  A few observations can be made from these statistics.  
Because LIVEDGAR has very few filings available before 1994, there were not a 
significant number of observations until then.  Furthermore, sharp increases in 
observations, ranging from roughly 100 to 214 in magnitude, from 1994 to 1997 can be 
attributed almost entirely to movement in the CRSP/SDC portion of the dataset, as the 
IRRC portion remained fairly stable during that period.  However, a similar spike from 
1997 to 1998 is primarily due to an increase in the IRRC subset, as opposed to 
CRSP/SDC.   
It should be noted, however, that this movement in the number of observations is 
due as much to the nature of the available yearly data in LIVEDGAR as it is to actual 
changes in the number of dual-class firms in each year.  While the number of IRRC-
flagged dual-class firms does increase through their editions and spikes significantly in   11
1998, it can be seen that even that alone cannot account for the movement particular to 
our dataset.
5  
Table 3 also shows the characteristics of the firm’s equity.  In Panel A, we show 
how many of the classes trade on an organized exchange.  We see that in each year, only 
about 20 to 30 percent of the dual-class firms have all classes of common stock trading.  
This illustrates why our sample is substantially larger than previous dual-class samples 
that have been analyzed.  Previous samples are identified if both classes of shares trade.  
As we can see in Table 3, this is a minority of the dual-class companies that exist on the 
public markets.  In addition, it is not surprising that in the vast majority of cases in which 
some classes of common stock do not trade, only the inferior class trades.  This is 
consistent with the dual-class structure being employed to provide increased control to 
management. 
We also note the voting structure of the dual-class firms in Panel A.  The most 
common structure of dual-class firms is a 1:10 voting structure in which the superior 
voting stock has ten votes for each share while the inferior voting stock has only one.  
Panel B shows the resulting cash flow ownership and voting ownership patterns for dual-
class firms.  We tabulate the fraction of cash flow ownership that comes from the 
superior voting stock and the percentage of cash flow ownership that comes from the 
inferior voting stock.  We assume that cash flow rights are proportional to the ordinary 
dividends on the shares if they exist.  If dividends are not paid, we assume cash flow 
rights are equal across all classes.  
                                                 
5 IRRC-flagged dual-class firms totaled: 111 in 1990, 120 in 1993, 123 in 1995, 207 in 
1998, 217 in 2000, and 225 in 2002.   12
Overall, the managers and directors of dual-class firms own a significant fraction 
of the firm’s cash flow rights.  On average, 26.7 percent of the cash flow rights are owned 
by managers and directors.  At 22.0 percent, the median ownership is also quite high, 
with a maximum cash flow ownership of 86.9 percent.  This cash flow ownership comes 
primarily from ownership of the superior voting stock.  On average, 16.0 percent of cash 
flow rights come from the superior voting stock and only 10.6 percent comes from the 
inferior voting class. 
Voting ownership is, not surprisingly, substantially higher than cash flow 
ownership.  Managers and directors of dual-class firms in our sample own, on average, 
50.7 percent of the voting rights of the firm.  Median inside ownership of voting rights is 
quite high, 54.2 percent.  On average, nearly all of the voting rights ownership comes 
from the superior voting class stock.  47.1 percent of the voting rights are owned through 
the superior voting class stock while only 3.7 percent comes from the inferior voting 
class. 
A more complete picture of the ownership structure of these firms can be seen in 
Table 4 in which we present a cross-tabulation of cash flow ownership and voting 
ownership.  First, voting rights ownership is higher than cash flow ownership, i.e., most 
firms lie in the southwest quadrant of the table.  It is not surprising that the majority of 
firms in the sample have managerial and director ownership of voting rights that are 
higher than their ownership of cash flow rights. Note, however, that there are a few dual-
class firms in which managers and directors own less of the firm’s voting rights than they 
do of the cash flow rights.  
    13
3.  The Relationship of Incentives and Control with Firm Valuation and 
Performance 
In this section, we explore the relation between firm performance and insider 
ownership of cash flow rights (incentives) and voting rights (control).  In particular, we 
examine the effect that these ownership variables have on firm value; operating 
performance as measured by net profit margin, sales growth, and return on equity; and 
firm investment rates. 
In order to examine the non-linear effects of cash flow and voting ownership on 
performance, we use both the level of ownership as well as the square of the level of 
ownership.  We employed other types of non-linear specifications including the piece-
wise regressions of Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) and found qualitatively similar 
results.  The quadratic specification, however, allows the peak in the relation between 
cash flow or voting ownership and firm performance to be identified from the data rather 
than being pre-specified. 
 
3.1. Firm Valuation 
Our valuation measure is Tobin’s Q, which has been used for this purpose in 
corporate-governance studies since the work of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1988).  We follow Kaplan and Zingales’ (1997) method for the 
computation of Q. For dual-class firms with an untraded class of stock, we assume that 
the untraded shares have the same per-share price as the traded shares.
6  We also compute 
the median Q in each year in each of the 48 industries classified by Fama and French 
                                                 
6 On average, non-traded stock makes up a small part of capital structure, so this 
assumption does not have a significant quantitative impact on our results.    14
(1997) and classify all firms into one of these 48 industries based on their four-digit SIC 
code.   We then regress: 
 
(1)       Q’it  = a + bXit + cWit + eit,             
 
where Q’it  is industry-adjusted Q (firm Q minus industry-median Q),  Xit is a vector of 
ownership variables (managerial cash flow ownership and cash flow ownership squared 
as well as managerial voting rights ownership and voting rights ownership squared) and 
Wit is a vector of firm characteristics.  As elements of W, we follow Shin and Stulz (2000) 
and include the log of the book value of assets and the log of firm age as of December of 
year t.  Morck and Yang (2001) show that S&P 500 inclusion has a positive impact on Q, 
and that this impact increased during the 1990s; thus, we also include a dummy variable 
for S&P 500 inclusion in W.  Previous work has also argued that younger firms may have 
more future growth opportunities and, hence, higher Tobin’s Q. 
We present two regression specifications in Table 5: median Fama-MacBeth and 
pooled median regressions.  Because the distribution of Q for our sample of firms is 
heavily skewed with some outliers, we employ median regression analysis.
7  Using a 
variant of the methods of Fama and MacBeth (1973), we estimate annual cross-sections 
of (1) with statistical significance assessed within each year (by cross-sectional standard 
errors) and across all years (with the time-series standard error of the mean coefficient).  
While this method allows for cross sectional correlation, it assumes no correlation in the 
                                                 
7 We also estimated other forms of robust regression analysis and the results were 
qualitatively similar to the median regression results.   15
time-series dimension.  In Table 5, we present only the time series means and standard 
errors of the coefficients.  
In addition to the Fama-MacBeth regressions, we estimate a pooled cross-section 
regression.  In this regression approach, the standard errors are calculated using a block 
bootstrap method that treats each firm as an independent vector.  It assumes cross-
sectional independence but allows for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. 
In the median Fama-MacBeth framework we see that total relationship between 
firm value and cash flow ownership is positive and concave: the average coefficient on 
cash flow ownership is positive and significant, and the coefficient on the square of cash 
flow ownership is negative and significant.  Taken together, the results are consistent 
with the view that ownership of cash flow rights by insiders does indeed align incentives.  
As the fraction of cash flow ownership increases, the incentives of management become 
more closely aligned with those of outside shareholders and thus leads to better decisions 
(from the outside shareholders’ perspective) and higher valuations. The positive incentive 
effects of cash flow ownership, however, are decreasing at higher levels of cash flow 
ownership.  The declining incentive effect may be due to several factors including wealth 
effects in which the incentive to work hard declines as CEOs become wealthier.   
Alternatively, the increasing lack of diversification on the part of insiders at high levels 
of ownership may induce them to pursue less risky strategies than outside investors 
would. 
The total relationship between firm value and voting ownership is negative and 
convex: the coefficient on voting ownership is negative and significant while the 
coefficient on its squared term is positive and significant.  The result implies that   16
increases in inside ownership of votes, keeping the level of inside cash flow ownership 
constant, decreases firm value at a decreasing rate.  This is consistent with an 
entrenchment effect of voting ownership, i.e., the more control that the insiders have, the 
more they can pursue strategies that are at the expense of outside shareholders.  Our 
results appear to be able to separately identify an incentive effect associated with insider 
ownership of cash flow rights and an entrenchment effect associated with insider 
ownership of voting rights.  The median pooled regression gives qualitatively similar 
results but is less statistically significant.
8 
Figure 1 provides a useful benchmark for the reasonableness of these results.   
From the coefficient estimates in the Fama-MacBeth regressions, we plot the total effect 
of incentives (cash flow + cash flow
2) and control (voting + voting
2) of changes in levels 
of voting and cash flow ownership by insiders on firm value.  The incentive effect 
reaches a maximum at around 33 percent ownership of cash flow rights while the 
entrenchment effect of voting ownership reaches its maximum at around 45 percent.  The 
economic impact of both effects is quite large.  As Figure 1 makes clear, going from the 
minimum value for cash flow and incentives to its maximal effect increases Tobin’s Q by 
about 15 percentage points. Voting rights ownership has an effect of similar magnitude.  
Going from zero to 45 percent inside voting ownership reduces Tobin’s Q by about 25 
percentage points. 
The quadratic structure of these point estimates implies that at very high levels, 
voting ownership appears to be good  for firm value.  One should be cautious in 
interpreting this part of Figure 1.  Since few firms have very high voting ownership, the 
                                                 
8 The results from estimating this pooled regression including annual dummy variables 
were also similar.   17
extrapolation of the total effect is less reliable at these high levels.  Also, from a pure 
statistical perspective, the standard error of the total effect rises with ownership.  This 
standard error is approximately 6 percentage points when voting ownership is 20 percent 
but rises to 53 percentage points when voting ownership is 100 percent.  
 
3.2. Operating Performance 
  In this section we explore the relation between the inside ownership of cash flow 
rights and voting rights and operating performance.  In the previous section, we saw that 
the relationship of firm value and inside cash flow ownership is positive and concave, 
while the relationship of firm value and inside ownership of voting rights is negative and 
convex.  This section explores whether there are also any detectable effects on the firm’s 
operations. 
In Table 6, we examine the firm’s net profit margin, sales growth, and return on 
equity.  We again employ the two estimation frameworks that were presented in the 
previous section: Fama-MacBeth median regressions and pooled cross-sectional median 
regressions.  The dependent variable is adjusted for the median level of performance 
within the firm’s industry.  Industries are defined by Fama and French (1997) and we 
classify all firms based on their four-digit SIC code into 48 industries.  We include the 
firm’s Q as an additional regressor to control for differences in the firms’ opportunity 
sets. 
The results for both return on equity and net profit margin are insignificant.  The 
most significant results are in the sales growth regressions.  There, we find exactly the 
same qualitative relationship as found for Tobin’s Q:  The relationship of sales growth to   18
cash flow ownership is positive and concave, and the relationship of sales growth to 
voting ownership is negative and convex.  Note that the inclusion of Q as a regressor 
ensures that these results are not merely driven by the relationship of these ownership 
variables with Q – this is a separate set of relationships that have the same shape.  
  
3.3. Capital Expenditure, Research and Development, and Advertising 
  The operating results suggest that the alignment of incentives through cash flow 
ownership increases the willingness of managers to invest and pursue more rapid growth, 
while voting ownership does the opposite.  To directly test how these two effects may 
affect firm investment behavior, we explore the relationship between voting and cash 
flow ownership by insiders on capital expenditure and on the combination of R&D and 
advertising expenditures. 
In Table 7 we examine results for the ratios of both capital expenditure to assets 
and capital expenditure to sales.  We again employ the median Fama-MacBeth and 
pooled cross sectional regression approaches. We find that the relation between capital 
expenditure and our ownership variables is consistent with those found for Q and for 
sales growth: positive and concave for cash flow and negative and convex for voting.  
However, only the (linear) cash flow coefficients are significant.  
Some firms may not have significant physical assets.  In these firms, investment 
in future business opportunities usually takes the form of research and development 
activities or advertising expenditures.  While the cost of these activities is typically 
expensed, they are investments in “soft” assets of the firm.  In Table 8, we examine the   19
relation between insider ownership of cash flows and voting rights and these 
expenditures.   
One complicating factor for this analysis is that some firms do not report R&D or 
advertising expenditures.  In this case, the values will be missing.  These firms also 
sometimes directly indicate that these expenditures are insignificant.  In both of these 
cases, we set the firm’s R&D and/or advertising expenses to zero. 
The above procedure means that a large number of firms have zero for both 
advertising and R&D expenditures.  Therefore in Table 8 we estimate Tobit regressions 
of the ratio of R&D and advertising expenses to assets (industry-adjusted) on our 
ownership variables, firm size, and Q.  In particular, we specify the dependent variable 
(R&D plus advertising) to be truncated if it is equal to zero.  Since we subsequently make 
industry adjustments, our estimation procedure uses a different truncation point for each 
industry.   
The results in Table 8 provide the strongest confirmation of the underinvestment 
hypothesis discussed above. In both regressions, the pattern of the coefficients mirrors 
those in the Q, sales growth, and capital expenditure regressions: positive and concave 
for cash flow and negative and convex for voting.  In the Fama-MacBeth regressions, 
three out of the four key coefficients are significant.   
  Taken together, the results in Table 7 and Table 8 are broadly supportive of 
underinvestment by dual-class firms driving both the valuation and sales growth results 
found in Tables 5 and 6.  In dual-class firms, the alignment of incentives through higher 
insider cash flow ownership has a positive effect on the level of investment.  Control 
appears to have the opposite effect, i.e., increases in control reduce capital expenditure.   20
4. Discussion and Conclusion 
  This paper examines the relation between ownership and firm performance in 
dual-class companies.  Because dual-class structures allow for the separation of cash flow 
and voting ownership, we can independently identify the impact of incentives and control 
on firm valuation and performance.  We find that cash flow ownership (incentives) has a 
positive (and concave) relationship with firm valuation while voting ownership (control) 
has a negative (and convex) relationship with firm value.  We find the same qualitative 
relationships for our ownership variables with sales growth, capital expenditure, R&D 
and advertising.  
  It is of course possible that these results are driven by some outside factor: e.g., 
valuation is driven by some measure of “management quality”, and management quality 
in turn drives the particular form of dual-class structure adopted across firms. While 
similar arguments are often made to explain the overall (single-class) relationship of 
ownership to performance, we find this argument to be less compelling in the dual-class 
context.  In particular, it is difficult to tell a logical story that can explain the quadratic 
relationships of our ownership variables with value, sales growth, capital expenditure, 
R&D and advertising.  The most plausible explanation is that some firms adopt dual-class 
structures when their original owners are reluctant to cede control; later, these firms are 
less likely to tap capital markets (so as to avoid diluting control) and thus invest less, 
grow slower, and are valued lower.  Our future work will model this causal chain more 
formally and directly test its implications.      
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
This table gives means and medians (in brackets beneath the mean) of several variables for 
single- and dual-class firms in 2001.  The mean and median of G, the Governance Index, are 
calculated only for the subsamples of single and dual-class IRRC firms.  This subsample 
contains 1052 single-class firms and 85 dual-class firms.  For the remaining variables, the 
statistics are calculated for the full dual-class sample, and the single-class sample consists of 
all firms in the CRSP-Compustat merged database, excluding the firms identified as dual-class.  
The calculation of G is described in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003).  Assets is the book 
value of assets in millions of dollars (Compustat item 6); Debt/Assets is the ratio of long-term 
debt (item 9) to assets; SP500 is a dummy variable for inclusion in the S&P 500 as of the end 
of calendar year 2000; Age is firm age in years as of December 2001; Size is market value in 
millions at the end of 2001, where the market value for dual-class firms with non-trading 
classes is calculated using shares outstanding from proxy statements and assuming equal prices 
across classes; and BM is the ratio of book value [the sum of book common equity (item 60) 
and deferred taxes (item 74)] to size at the end of 2001.  Significant differences for the means 
are indicated at the five- and one-percent levels by * and ** respectively.  The Wilcoxon rank-
sum test p-values for the medians are given in brackets in the third column. 
 
  Single-Class Dual-Class  Difference 






     
Assets             4,289.48 
           [187.11] 
          4,113.90 
[816.06] 
            175.58 
[0.0000] 










            0.00 


















N 4824  168   
 




Panel A of this table summarizes the most common industries in the single- and dual-class 
samples of firms in December 2001, by number of firms.  We match four-digit SIC codes to 
the 48 industries designated by Fama and French (1997).   Panel B lists the 20 dual-class firms 
with the largest market capitalizations at the end of 2001 and their industries, where the market 
value for dual-class firms with non-trading classes is calculated using shares outstanding from 
proxy statements and assuming equal prices across classes.  The firms are in descending order 
of market capitalization. 
Panel A: Industries 
Single-Class Dual-Class 
Business Services  Communication 
Electronic Equipment  Business Services 
Trading Printing  and  Publishing 
Pharmaceutical Products  Retail 
Retail Machinery 
Panel B: Large Dual-Class Firms 
Firm Industry 
Berkshire Hathaway Inc  Insurance 
Viacom Inc  Communication 
Comcast Corp  Communication 
Cox Communications Inc Communication 
Columbia Hospital Corp  Healthcare 
Echostar Communications Corp  Communication 
Broadcom Corp  Electronic Equipment 
Wrigley  Candy and Soda 
HSN Inc  Communication 
Hershey Foods Corp  Candy and Soda 
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Table 3 
Voting and Ownership Structure 
Panel A of this table describes voting arrangements for the sample of dual-class firms between 
1994 and 2001.  It summarizes the relationship between the superior class and the inferior class 
with the most votes per share of any inferior class.  Panel B summarizes cashflow and voting 
ownership in the dual-class firms in 2001.  VTOwn is the total percentage of votes owned by 
officers and directors across classes, as reported in proxy statements.  CFOwn is the total 
percentage of cashflow ownership by officers and directors.  Rights to the firm’s cashflows are 
assumed to be proportional to the ordinary dividends of that class if dividend data exists.  If 
dividend data does not exist or if the dividend distribution is not ordinary, cashflow rights are 
assumed to be equal across classes. 
 
Panel A: Voting Structure 
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Number  of  dual-class  firms  100 125 170 214 255 242 245 215 
 All  classes  trade  publicly  30 44 47 50 49 52 45 42 
  Some classes do not trade 
publicly 
70  81  123 164 206 190 200 173 
  Only the inferior classes 
trade 
66  74  107 146 177 165 178 157 
          
Dual-class  voting  arrangements          
 Voting  ratio  >  1:10  9  11 10 11 11 12 14 13 
  Voting ratio = 1:10  64  77  97  126  152  144  152  139 









Panel B: Ownership Structure 










CFOwn  0.267  0.205 0.000 0.220 0.869 
Ownership in Superior Class  0.160  0.150 0.000 0.125 0.698 
Ownership in Inferior Class(es)  0.106  0.130 0.000 0.054 0.629 
        
VTOwn  0.507  0.292 0.000 0.542 1.000 
Ownership in Superior Class  0.471  0.288 0.000 0.501 1.000 
Ownership in Inferior Class(es)  0.037  0.069 0.000 0.008 0.519   27 
 
Table 4 
Relationship Between Managerial Voting Ownership and Cash Flow Ownership 
 
The table summarizes cashflow and voting ownership in the dual-class firms between 1994 and 2001.  Voting Ownership is the total percentage of 
votes owned by officers and directors across classes as reported in proxy statements.  Cash flow ownership by officers and directors are the rights 
to the firm’s cashflows assuming that they are proportional to the ordinary dividends of that class if dividend data exists.  If dividend data does not 
exist or if dividend distribution is not ordinary, cashflow rights are assumed to be equal across classes. 
 
 
                 C a s h   F l o w             
      0-5  5 - 10  10 - 15  15-20  20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50 50-55 55-60  60-65 65-70 70-75 75-80 80-85 85-90 90-95 95-100
 0 - 5   2 0 5   3   0   1   00000000   00 00000 0
  5  -  1 0   1 7   1 3   0   1   00000000   00 00000 0
  1 0  -  1 5   6   1 6   9   1   00001000   00 00000 0
 1 5 - 2 0  1 0   9   8   2 2   40000000   00 00000 0
 2 0 - 2 5   7   1 9   1 2   1 8   96111000   00 00000 0
 2 5 - 3 0   2   6   1 2   7   78100000   00 00000 0
 3 0 - 3 5   1   1 1   1 6   1 1   94501000   00 00000 0
 3 5 - 4 0   5   1 4   1 4   8   1 7 1 0420010   00 00000 0
 4 0 - 4 5   1   1 2   1 1   1 8   7 1 2643000   00 00000 0
V o t i n g  4 5 - 5 0   1   1   1 2   7   9 1 0 1 630131   10 00000 0
 50-55  8  2  14  7  9 11 6 12 10 2 3 2  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 55-60  0  0  15  9  17 8 7 7 8 6 10 6  0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
 6 0 - 6 5   0   1   3   1 4   1 1 1 3 1 383995   71 00000 0
 65-70  0  3  0  16  16 7 24 9 8 10 5 4  2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
 7 0 - 7 5   0   0   1   2   2 08 1 2 1 18766   29 21000 0
 75-80  0  3  0  0  1 28 10 14 11 6 1 2  3 0 4 2 0 0 0 0
 80-85  1  7  1  1  0 0 3 6 3 9 17 11  7 3 1 0 0 0 0 0
 85-90  2  4  1  1  2 1 0 4 6 11 14 13  11 14 4 1 0 0 0 0
 90-95  1  1  0  0  0 0 0 1 0 5 19 8  12 13 7 4 1 3 0 0









This table presents median regressions of industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q on ownership 
variables and controls between 1994 and 2001.  The first column contains the time-series 
mean coefficients and standard errors from annual, median Fama-MacBeth regressions.  
The second column shows the coefficients and standard errors from pooled, median 
regressions.  The standard errors are calculated using 5000 repetitions of a block bootstrap 
that treats each firm as a block.  Q is the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value 
of assets:  the market value is calculated as the sum of the book value of assets and the 
market value of common stock less the book value of common stock and deferred taxes.  
The market value of equity for dual-class firms with non-trading classes is calculated using 
shares outstanding from proxy statements and assuming equal prices across classes.  The 
market value of equity is measured at the end of the current calendar year and the 
accounting variables are measured in the current fiscal year.  CFOwn and VTOwn are 
defined as in Table 3, and CFOwnSq and VTOwnSq are their respective squares.  Assets is 
the log of the book value of assets in millions of dollars, SP500 is a dummy variable for 
inclusion in the S&P 500 as of the end of the previous year, and Age is the log of firm age 
measured in months as of December of each year.  Industry adjustments are made by 
subtracting the industry median, where medians are calculated by matching the four-digit 
SIC codes from December of each year to the 48 industries designated by Fama and French 
(1997).  Significance at the five- and one-percent levels is indicated by * and **, 
respectively. 
 
  Median Fama-MacBeth  Median Pooled 




CFOwnSq     -1.44** 
(0.31) 
                       -1.49 
(1.04) 
VTOwn    -1.06** 
(0.26) 
                       -0.86 
(0.49) 
VTOwnSq     1.17** 
(0.27) 
  1.04* 
(0.50) 
Assets                      -0.02 
(0.01) 
                         -0.00 
(0.02) 
SP500      0.44** 
(0.06) 
  0.43* 
(0.19) 
Age                      -0.04 
(0.03) 
                       -0.05 
                       (0.04) 
Constant 0.40 
(0.28) 
                        0.28 
                       (0.31) 




This table contains the results of median regressions of net profit margin, sales growth, and 
return on equity on lagged ownership variables and lagged Q between 1995 and 2002.  Panel A 
shows the time-series mean coefficients and standard errors from annual, median Fama-
MacBeth regressions.  Panel B shows the coefficients and standard errors of pooled, median 
regressions.  The standard errors are calculated using 5000 repetitions of a block bootstrap that 
treats each firm as a block.  CFOwn and VTOwn are defined as in Table 3, and Q is defined as 
in Table 4.  Each dependent variable is net of the industry median, which is calculated by 
matching the four-digit SIC codes of all firms in the CRSP-Compustat merged database in 
December of each year to the 48 industries designated by Fama and French (1997).  
Significance at the five-percent and one-percent levels is indicated by * and **, respectively. 
Panel A: Median Fama-MacBeth Regressions 
  Net Profit Margin  Sales Growth  Return on Equity 
CFOwn                -0.078 
(0.036) 
 0.257* 
             (0.086) 
              -0.089 
(0.120) 




              0.062 
(0.170) 
VTOwn  0.010 
(0.026) 
             -0.035 
             (0.031) 
              -0.125 
(0.061) 
VTOwnSq  0.005 
(0.022) 
  0.072* 
(0.030) 
  0.134* 
(0.049) 
Q     0.021** 
 (0.005) 
  0.018** 
 (0.004) 
    0.031** 
(0.005) 
Constant                -0.008 
(0.014) 




Panel B: Median Pooled Regressions 
  Net Profit Margin  Sales Growth  Return on Equity 
CFOwn                -0.033 
(0.082) 
   0.220* 
 (0.111) 
              -0.019 
(0.117) 
CFOwnSq                -0.015 
(0.101) 
              -0.381* 
              (0.153) 
              -0.082 
(0.159) 
VTOwn                -0.006 
(0.057) 
              -0.054 
              (0.074) 
              -0.112 
(0.077) 
VTOwnSq  0.016 
(0.048) 




Q     0.014** 
 (0.004) 
   0.014* 
 (0.006) 
    0.027** 
(0.007) 
Constant  -0.002 
(0.012) 




N  1167 1166 1153 
 




This table contains the results of median regressions of CAPEX/assets and CAPEX/sales on 
lagged ownership variables and lagged Q between 1995 and 2002.  Panel A shows the time-
series mean coefficients and standard errors from annual, median Fama-MacBeth 
regressions.  Panel B shows the coefficients and standard errors of pooled, median 
regressions.  The standard errors are calculated using 5000 repetitions of a block bootstrap 
that treats each firm as a block.  CFOwn and VTOwn are defined as in Table 3, and Q is 
defined as in Table 4.  Both dependent variables are net of the industry median, which is 
calculated by matching the four-digit SIC codes of all firms in the CRSP-Compustat merged 
database in December of each year to the 48 industries designated by Fama and French 
(1997).  Significance at the five-percent and one-percent levels is indicated by * and **, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Median Fama-MacBeth Regressions 
  CAPEX/Assets CAPEX/Sales 
























Panel B: Median Pooled Regressions 
  CAPEX/Assets CAPEX/Sales 
























N  1135 1135 
 






















R&D and Advertising Regressions 
This table presents Tobit regressions of (R&D+Advertising)/Assets on lagged ownership 
variables and lagged Q between 1995 and 2002.  The first column contains the time-series 
mean coefficients and standard errors from annual, Tobit Fama-MacBeth regressions.  The 
second column shows the coefficients and standard errors from pooled, Tobit regressions.  
The standard errors allow for clustering within firms.  CFOwn and VTOwn are defined as in 
Table 3, and Q is defined as in Table 4.  The dependent variable is net of the industry 
median, which is calculated by matching the four-digit SIC codes of all firms in the CRSP-
Compustat merged database in December of each year to the 48 industries designated by 
Fama and French (1997).  Significance at the five-percent and one-percent levels is 
indicated by * and **, respectively. 
 
  Tobit Fama-MacBeth  Tobit Pooled 
CFOwn   0.092* 
                    (0.036) 
0.075 
  (0.155) 




VTOwn                      -0.254** 
(0.051) 
                        -0.241 
  (0.158) 
VTOwnSq      0.225** 
(0.050) 
0.217 
  (0.163) 
Q      0.017** 
(0.005) 
       0.007** 
   (0.003) 
Constant   -0.033* 
 (0.010) 
    -0.021 
  (0.026) 
N   1169   32 
Figure 1
This figure plots the estimated relationship between Tobin's Q and the ownership variables, CFOwn and VTOwn. 
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